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Book Review
Every Manager's Legal Guide to Hiring
By August Bequai.
Homewood: Dow Jones-Irwin. 1990."
Pp xiii, 189. $39.95.
I. INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination law presents an incredible array of practical
problems for managers and other human resource practitioners.' Every
Manager's Legal Guide to Hiring,2 by August Bequai,3 attempts to educate
the non-legal practitioner on the legal consequences of improper employee
selection.
Mr. Bequai strives to provide an overview of hiring law in an attempt to
help managers avoid the legal pitfalls that can accompany recruiting,
screening, testing and interviewing job applicants. The book examines a
broad range of discriminatory practices and places them strictly into the
context of hiring.
Each chapter of Every Manager's Legal Guide To Hiring begins with
illustrations of how an employer can get into trouble by failing to "hire
right.",4 The author aims to do more than merely describe discriminatory
hiring practices. He evaluates the effect of discrimination laws on hiring and
provides managers with general guidelines on proper procedures to employ in
hiring.
1. The massive body of federal law, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Equal
Pay Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, and state fair employment laws have created a need
for managers and other human resource professionals to be well educated in the law
to avoid costly litigation.
2. A. BEQUAI, EVERY MANAGER'S LEGAL GUIDE To HIRING (1990).
3. Mr. Bequai has taught at George Washington University, The American
University, and New York University. He is presently in private practice in
Washington, D.C. His other books include: COMPUTER CRIME (1978); How TO
PREVENT COMPUTER CRIME: A GUIDE FOR MANAGERS (1983); WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: A 20TH-CENTURY CRISIS (1978); and MAKING WASHINGTON WORK FOR YOU
(1984).
4. The book provides no legal references and uses no legal terminology in the
anecdotes illustrating cases which emphasize discriminatory hiring practices.
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This review analyzes Every Manager's Legal Guide to Hiring in the
context of current Missouri and federal law, with the purpose of providing an
in-depth look at hiring laws for the Missouri practitioner.
II. THE EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Missouri continues to follow the "at-will doctrine" of employment.5 This
means that an employer may hire or fire at will-for good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all.' Since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII),7
however, Congress has passed laws to prevent an employer from relying on
the at-will doctrine when his or her conduct results in discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' The Civil Rights Act
of 1964, along with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,9 the Age Discrimina-
5. Bethea v. Levi Strauss & Co., 827 F.2d 355, 359-60 (8th Cir. 1987) (Missouri
employers may terminate employees at any time, absent contract for definite term);
Enyeart v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 693 S.W.2d 120, 122 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Ain
employer may discharge an employee who is not subject to a contract of employment
for a definite term, at any time with or without cause provided no statutory provision
is violated.").
6. A. BEQUAI, supra note 2, at 4. Missouri courts have set aside the at-will
doctrine where an employee can show that there was an implied contract based upon
the employers personnel handbook which was disseminated to all employees. See
Matthews v. Federal Land Bank, 718 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000e-17 (1988).
8. Title VII provides:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
9. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides in pertinent part:
(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but
are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs,
as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work, and nothing in section 2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to
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tion in Employment Act of 1967,10 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973," and the
Equal Pay Act of 196312 have worked to limit the employer's ability to
invoke the at-will doctrine. These Acts have in essence created a new at-will
doctrine. Missouri also has enacted statutes designed to protect employees
from discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
ancestry, age or handicap. 3
Mr. Bequai gives the following common sense approach to avoiding
problems when invoking the at-will doctrine: "Avoid anything that smacks
permit otherwise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
10. The Age Discrimination Act provides in pertinent part:
§ 623. Prohibition of age discrimination.
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or to
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age ....
§ 631. Age Limits.
The prohibitions in this chapter... shall be limited to individuals who
are at least 40 years of age.
29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631 (1988).
11. The Rehabilitation Act of 1933 provides:
§ 794. Nondiscrimination under Federal grants and programs.
(a) Promulgation of rules and regulations.
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the
United States .... shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of,
or be subjected to discrimination under ?ny program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance under any program or
activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service.
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
12. The Equal Pay Act provides in part:
(1) No employer.., shall discriminate, within any establishment in
which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of
sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than
the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar
working conditions, except where such payment is made pursuant to... -
any other factor other than sex.
Id. § 206(d).
13. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.055 (1986).
1991]
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of bias." 14 This is a very straightforward rule of thumb to follow and, as he
points out, "all that the new at-will doctrine really asks of employers is that
they base their hiring decisions on merit and qualifications for the job."'5
III. DISCRIMINATORY CONDUCT
IN THE EMPLOYMENT PROCESS
Up to this point, the author has discussed the statutes that define and
determine the existence of illegal discrimination. Next the author discusses
the various actions by which illegal discrimination may be effected in the
hiring process. Discrimination may occur through discriminatory job
classifications, advertising, recruitment, wage rates, testing, pre-employment
inquiries, application forms, and subjective interviews.
A. Job Classification
Separate job classifications based upon sex are violations of Title VII,' 6
unless sex, national origin or religion is a "bonafide occupational qualifica-
tion"1 7for the particular job. Of course, it is not necessary that the employer
14. A. BEQUAI, supra note 2, at 15.
15. Id.
16. E.E.O.C. Guidelines state: "Label[s]-Men'sjobs' and Women's jobs'-tend
to deny employment opportunities unnecessarily to one sex or the other." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.2(a) (1989). "Accordingly, employment practices are unlawful which arbitrarily
classify jobs so that ... [a] female is prohibited from applying for a job labeled
"male" or for a job in a "male" line of progression; and vice versa ... ." Id. §
1604.3(a); see also Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969)
(holding Title VII was violated by a system of job classification discriminating against
females from competing for jobs that required lifting more than thirty-five pounds).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1988). Generally, the "bonafide occupational
qualification exception is applicable in situations involving explicit discrimination,
while the business necessity doctrine is applicable to practices which are neutral on
their face, but which have a discriminatory impact." See Annotation, Business
Necessity, 36 A.L.R. FED. 9 (1978).
The business necessity doctrine has been defined in many different ways and
there does not seem to be a general consensus as to what test will be used. See Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (if an employment practice cannot be shown
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited); Jones v. Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970) (an employment practice may be justified
by business necessity if it is necessary to the safety and efficiency of the employer's
business), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d
791 (4th Cir. 1971) (whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the challenged practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the
[Vol. 56
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literally use such labels as "male jobs" and "female jobs" to violate the rule
against job classification based on sex. A history of the employer filling a
particular category exclusively with members of one sex suffices."8
B. Advertising
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an
employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print any advertise-
ment indicating a preference based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, except where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupation-
al qualification for employment.' 9 In Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Commission On Human Relations,0 the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance
which prohibited newspapers from carrying "'help-wanted' advertisements in
sex-designated columns, except where the employer is free to make hiring or
employment referral decisions on the basis of sex."2' The Court noted that
advertisers who place ads in a "Male Interest" column are likely to discrimi-
nate against women in the hiring decision.22
employer's business), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
18. See Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1981) (special
salesman status was occupied by females and regular salesman status was occupied
entirely by males); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(airline's classification of "purser" and "stewardess" did not reflect substantial
differences in duties and purser was a male classification with higher pay), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); Thompson v. Boyle, 499 F. Supp. 1147 (D. D.C. 1979)
(Government Printing Office was held to be in violation of Title VII because of its
practice of hiring all female bindery employees as journeyman bindery workers).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1988). The section provides in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor
organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-
job training programs, to print or publish or cause to be printed or
published any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an
employer or membership in or any classification or referral for employment
by such a labor organization .... any preference, limitation, specification,
or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,
except 'that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex or national
origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification for employment.
Id.
20. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
21. Id. at 378.
22. Id. at 387.
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C. Recruiting
In recruiting, the employer should not deter qualified applicants from
seeking interviews by indicating a preference as to race, religion, sex, or
national origin.23  The employer may not rely on word-of-mouth for
recruiting because the recruitment of applicants by word-of-mouth perpetuates
discrimination when the work force is predominantly white.24 In Catlett v.
Missouri Highway & Transportation Commission,25 the court found that the
Commission's hiring process was discriminatory because its word-of-mouth
recruiting policy generated disproportionately low numbers of female
applicants.
Recruitment requirements also apply to foreign employers who establish
offices and manufacturing plants in the United States.26 The foreign
employer must conduct a systematic recruitment of available American
workers to fill any open positions.27 To correct past discriminatory practices,
some courts have required that the employer undertake special recruitment
measures, such as contracting placement officers in predominately black high
schools and vocational schools, and advertising in newspapers or on radio
stations directed toward the black community. 28
23. See McDonald v. General Mills, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Cal. 1974). The
McDonald court held that plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action by alleging Ihat
she was deterred from making application and seeking interviews with the defendant
employer because of the employer's practice of indicating express preference to
interview and hire males at college placement center. Id. at 37.
24. See Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.
1972) (where a company had previously discriminated, the practice of not posting
notices of vacancies and allowing news of vacancies to be passed along by word-of-
mouth is itself discriminatory against black employees), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972). In Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (D. Mich. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), it was held that the company's practice
of hiring employees on the basis of word-of-mouth referrals violated Title VII in that
preference in both hiring and assignment was given to friends and relatives of the
predominately white work force. Id. at 117.
25. 589 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
26. See Imperial Textiles, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 642 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. I11.
1986). The Imperial court found that the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 212(a)(14) (1970), required that the employment of foreign workers could not be
allowed unless there were insufficient workers in the United States who were able,
willing, and qualified to perform the work. Imperial, 642 F. Supp. at 1042. The court
noted specifically that "Imperial failed to conduct a systematic recruitment of available
domestic workers." Id.
27. Imperial, 642 F. Supp. at 1042.
28. See Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 1100 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
198 [Vol. 56
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Another form of forbidden discrimination relates to wages. The Equal
Pay Act of 196329 and the provisions of Title VII on sex discrimination are
applied harmoniously 30 to eliminate wage discrimination. The jobs do not
need to be identical in every aspect, but merely substantially equal, to fall
within the auspices of the Equal Pay Act.3
E. Testing
Intelligence, aptitude, and educational testing are probably a more
prevalent issue in the context of race discrimination than in discrimination
based on sex.3" The landmark decisions of Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 33 and
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Mood)?4 both dealt with testing in which there was
no correlation between the test given and job performance. In both, the Court
stressed the necessity for validation of job tests through actual studies
demonstrating correlation between test scores and job performance. The
29. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988). The Act provides in part as follows:
(d)(1) No employer... shall discriminate.., between employees on
the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the
rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex ... for equal
work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.
Id.
30. Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce, 568 F.2d 593 (8th Cir. 1978). The court
found that Di Salvo was discriminated against when she was paid $4,000 less than one
male employee and $3,000 less than another while doing substantially the same job in
terms of skill, effort and responsibility. The court noted that in some instances she had
even more duties and responsibilities than her two male counterparts. Id. at 596.
31. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1620 (1989) (inconsequential
differences in job content is not a valid excuse for payment of a lower wage to an
employee of one sex than to an employee of the opposite sex if the two are performing
equal work on essentially the same jobs in the same establishment).
32. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the court held
that illegal race discrimination is present, whether intended deliberately or not, when
an aptitude test which is not job-related has a greater unfavorable impact on blacks
than on whites. The opinion stresses the necessity for validation of job tests through
actual studies demonstrating correlation between test scores and job performance. Id.
at 433-36.
33. Id. at 424.
34. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
1991]
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Eighth Circuit addressed this problem in Easley v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
where the court held that a test administered to 1,500 applicants had an
adverse impact on the protected group. Fifty percent of white applicants and
only thirty percent of black applicants passed a test which did not clearly
approximate job tasks.36 The court noted that proof of discriminatory motive
is not required in a case involving disparate impact.37
Many of the principles in racial discrimination cases appear in sex, age,
and handicapped discrimination litigation. This is especially true as to
employment requirements which specify a minimal level of physical
strength,38 or height and weight.39 The Uniform Guidelines on Employee
35. 758 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1985).
36. Id. at 251.
37. Disparate impact occurs when facially neutral employment decision-making
has a statistically significant and unjustifiable adverse effect on members of a protected
class. Although such practices or criteria are not intentionally discriminatory, they
perpetuate the effects of discrimination and are therefore invalid under Title VII. The
disparate impact analysis was first authorized by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
38. In Harless v. Duck, 619 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 872
(1980), a police department's physical ability test was found to have a disparate impact
on women and thus was discriminatory because there was no justification for the
physical strength requirement. Id. at 616. The court in Payne v. Travenol Laborato-
ries, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Miss. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 565 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1978), found the employer's heavy physical
requirements to be discriminatory sexually since the majority of material handling
work required little heavy lifting. Id. at 262-63. A physical agility test given to
applicants for the police department was found discriminatory in Thomas v. City of
Evanston, 610 F. Supp. 422 (N.D. 111. 1985), based upon disparate impact because the
test eliminated 85% of female applicants while eliminating only 10% of male
applicants. Id. at 427-29, 432.
39. In Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50 (8th Cir. 1977), the court
affirmed a lower court ruling that the airline's minimum height requirement for pilots
had a disparate impact on female applicants and thus established a prima facie case of
sex discrimination. The court further affirmed the 5'5" height requirement approved
by the lower court, which was the actual minimum height that could be accommodated
in the cockpit area. Id. at 54. The court in Costa v. Markey, 706 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1983) (en banc), held that a city's height requirement for police officers was a
violation of Title VII since it excluded 80% of the women applicants without a
showing of job-relatedness. Id. at 6. A height and weight requirement for the position
of state trooper was also found to be discriminatory in United States v. Commonwealth
of Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Va. 1978), because it disqualified disproportion-
ately more women than men. Id. at 1088.
[Vol. 56
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Selection Procedures40 ("Guidelines") contain the following basic prohibition
regarding testing:
"[A] [p]rocedure having adverse impact constitutes discrimination unless
justified. The use of any selection procedure which has an adverse impact
on the hiring, promotion, or other employment or membership opportunities
of members of any race, sex, or ethnic group will be considered to be
discriminatory and inconsistent with these guidelines, unless the procedure
has been validated in accordance with these guidelines ....
The Eighth Circuit, in Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of
St. LouiS,42 noted "that Title VII was not meant to preclude the use of testing
devices, and that what is forbidden is the controlling use of such tests 'unless
they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance.' '43 The
Guidelines supply detailed technical standards for validation studies,44 and
require that validation be in accord with generally accepted professional
standards, such as the American Psychological Association standards.45
Other types of testing that are of interest to employers include the use of
honesty tests and the use of drug and alcohol testing. As the cost of doing
business increases, managers have undoubtedly become more aware of losses
caused by employee theft. As a result, many employers require that applicants
take an honesty test. These tests are usually in the form of pencil and paper
tests "consist[ing] of a series of questions that use different angles to uncover
any dishonest behavioral traits of a prospective employee and the individual's
views toward punishment of dishonesty." 6  The Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 198847 bans the use of all lie detector tests in most private
employment settings. The paper and pencil honesty test, however, is excluded
from the definition of "lie detector, "48 and consequently the legality of its use
is still subject to debate.
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1989).
41. Id. § 1607.3(A). The guidelines go on to define selection procedure as
including "the full range of assessment techniques from traditional paper and pencil
tests, performance tests, training programs, or probationary periods and physical,
educational, and work experience requirements through informal or casual interviews
and unscored application forms." Id. § 1607.16(Q).
42. 549 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977).
43. Id. at 510 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436).
44. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.14 (1989).
45. Id. § 1607.5(C).
46. Comment, Prohibition of Pencil and Paper Honesty Tests: Is Honesty the
Best Policy?, 25 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 571, 572 n.5 (1989) (citation omitted).
47. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2001-2009 (West Supp. 1990).
48. Id. § 2001(3).
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Alcohol and drug abuse are among this nations highest concerns, as is
readily apparent from a brief glance at a newspaper or television. On
September 17, 1986, President Reagan issued Executive Order 1256441 which
prohibits drug use by federal employees and establishes a drug testing
program for employees in sensitive positions.50 In American Federation of
Government Employees, AFL-CIO v. Weinberger,51 the government required
civilian employees to sign a consent form for random drug and alcohol testing.
If the employee did not sign the consent form, he or she would be subject to
transfer or termination. The court preliminarily enjoined the Department of
Defense from implementing drug testing of any civilian employee without
probable cause. The court noted that private employers "can engage in
activity that, if conducted by the government would clearly violate the
Constitution."512 The court additionally stated that "private-sector employees
may be 'forced to consent' to random urine testing without individualized
suspicion as a condition of employment."53
The Supreme Court, in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Associa-
tion,54 recently held that drug and alcohol tests mandated or authorized by
the Federal Railroad Administration were reasonable under the fourth
amendment "in the absence of a warrant or reasonable suspicion that any
particular employee may be impaired."55 This was based upon the compel-
ling government interest served by the regulations, which outweighed
employees' privacy concerns.56 Courts generally refuse to invalidate a
private employer's drug and alcohol testing programs under the theory that the
constitutional right to privacy "protects against incursions by the government
and persons acting as government agents,"57 but that such a claim has little
force against a private employer.58
49. Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32,889, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7301
(1988).
50. Id.
51. 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
52. Id. at 737.
53. Id.
54. 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989).
55. Id. at 1422.
56. Id. at 1421.
57. Johnson v. Carpenter Technology Corp., 723 F. Supp. 180, 185 (D. Conn.
1989).
58. See id. (that constitutional right to privacy protects against incursions by the
government but has little force against a private employer who requires employee to
submit to drug and alcohol testing); Stevenson v. Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.,
680 F. Supp. 859 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (private action by employer in implementing drug
testing program is not subject to restrictions of the constitution); Greco v. Halliburton
Co., 674 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Wyo. 1987) (that constitutional proscriptions against
[Vol. 56
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The use of a pre-employment physical is not an unlawful employment
practice as long as the physical requirements are job-related.5 9 The use of
drug and alcohol testing in the pre-employment and periodic physical
examination is becoming more widespread.'
In addition, Mr. Bequai discusses an applicant's privacy rights and the
need to obtain the applicant's permission to receive certain records which are
confidential in nature, such as medical records, personnel records and school
records.6 1 An employers's use of background or character investigations for
employment may also be discriminatory if the evidence reveals that the
practice has had a disparate impact on minority applicants.62
F. Pre-Employment Inquiries
Illegal pre-employment questions may relate to arrests, convictions, child
care, pregnancy plans, and the like. Inquiry into the prior arrests and
convictions of an applicant may also be considered a violation of Title VII if
used to exclude that applicant.6 The Eighth Circuit's 1975 decision of
Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Coi 4 held in part that a flat disqualifica-
tion rule was not justified. The court stated, "We cannot conceive of any
business necessity that would automatically place every individual convicted
invasions of privacy, taking of property without due process and unauthorized searches
or seizures were not applicable to private employer who requires its employee to
submit to drug and alcohol testing).
59. E.g., Dorcus v. Westvaco Corp., 345 F. Supp. 1173 (W.D. Va. 1972) (that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not prohibit a medical examination
requirement where the physical requirements for employment clearly bore a substantial
relation to the adequacy of job performance).
60. See Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp. 590 (S.D.N.Y.
1988), in which the court noted that "approximately one-third of all United States
businesses and governmental entities have resorted to employee drug-testing programs.
The percentages vary according to industry, but ninety-one percent of the public
utilities and eighty-one perdent of the transportation industries employ testing." Id. at
593 (footnotes omitted).
61. A. BEQUAI, supra note 2, at 16-26.
62. In Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836, 844, 855-59 (S.D. Ohio 1975), the
court enjoined a city from using information gained from a background investigation
which included "health, arrests and convictions, education, residences, finances
([including any] indebtedness, bankruptcies, insurance), employment, and military
service" to determine if there had been any falsification of information on the
application. The court found that this policy had a disproportionate impact on minority
applicants and that it lacked a valid relationship to job performance. Id. at 851-52.
63. See Annotation, Employer's Use ofArrest Record, 33 A.L.R. FED. 263 (1977).
64. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
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of any offense, except a minor traffic offense, in the permanent ranks of the
unemployed."6 The court further observed that it was between 2.2 and 6.7
times as likely for a black as a white to be convicted during his lifetime.6
This does not mean that those previously convicted of a crime must be hired
indiscriminately. Rather, the opinion suggests an employment procedure
involving consideration of the individuals' particular offense in relation to the
particular job would probably not be objectionable.67 With this in mind, a
flat prohibition on the hiring of someone with a conviction record is a
violation of Title VII, while the use of the conviction record on a case-by-case
basis is probably acceptable.
The use of arrest records to exclude applicants is much more likely to
result in a finding of disparate impact. In Carter v. Gallagher,'s a fire
department's use of arrest records was found to be a violation of Title VII.
The district court stated that "an arrest record, per se, [was] not proof of any
criminal act and bears no rational relation to ability adequately to perform as
a fire fighter."'69
Other inquiries that have found their way into court relate to pregnancy
and child care. Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act70 courts have found
that aprimafacie case of sexual discrimination exists when a female applicant
is refused employment after being subjected to interview questions on
childbearing, child care, and the legitimacy of her children.71 The Equal
65. Id. at 1298.
66. Id. at 1294.
67. See also Hetherington v. California State Personnel Bd., 82 Cal. App. 3d 582,
147 Cal. Rptr. 300 (1978) (denying a black male, with two felony convictions, the
right to file applications for jobs as a youth counselor or parole agent was justified
since the restrictions against ex-felons were directed to the particular job of peace
officers).
68. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
69. Carter v. Gallagher, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 692, 697 (1972); accord
Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (information concerning a
prospective employee's record of arrest without convictions is irrelevant to his
suitability or qualification for employment and cannot be justified by business
necessity).
70. See supra note 9.
71. In King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 256 (8th Cir. 1984), a
woman was asked questions regarding her unwed marital status and the legitimacy of
her children, and child-care. The employer failed to rebut the presumption that this
information was used in the decision not to hire her. Id. at 259. The court held that
male applicants were not questioned about pregnancy, childbearing and childcare, and
as such an employer cannot have two interview policies for job applicants, one for men
and one for women. Id. at 258-59. Therefore, the questions were the product of
unlawful discrimination. Id. at 259.
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Employment Opportunity Commission's Sex Discrimination Guidelines72
state that "[a]ny pre-employment inquiry in connection with prospective
employment which expresses directly or indirectly any limitation, specifica-
tion, or discrimination as to sex shall be unlawful unless based upon a
bonafide occupational qualification."'73
Questions probing sexual lifestyle or sexual preference, including such
matters as homosexuality, transexuality, "adulterous" relationships, and
cohabitation, are not prohibited by Title VII. It has been held, however, that
a state school board violated a teacher's rights to due process and equal
protection when it denied him employment as a teacher solely on the basis of
his homosexuality.74 Furthermore, questions on sexual lifestyle directed at
women may violate one of the Acts which do fall under the auspices of Title
VII. As Mr. Bequai points out, "questions about a woman's sex life could
certainly be construed as a form of harassment, and Title VII prohibits sexual
harassment of female applicants and employees." 75
A related area of recent concern is whether women may be excluded
from employment which involves the risk of fetal injury. This issue was
recently addressed in International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,76 where
a battery manufacturer's fetal protection policy recited that "women with child
bearing capacity will neither be hired for nor allowed to transfer into those
jobs in which lead levels are defined as excessive. 7 7 The court upheld the
exclusion finding that the fetal protection policy was reasonably necessary to
further the industrial safety concerns of the employer.78
This same result was reached in Wright v. Olin Corp.7 9 In Wright, the
court found that the employer's "fetal vulnerability program," by which fertile
female employees were excluded from positions coming in contact with toxic
substances, was a violation of Title VII because it resulted in a disproportion-
ate adverse impact on the employment opportunities of women.80 The court
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1989).
73. Id. § 1604.7.
74. In Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 843 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 491
F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974), the court held that the
school board's policy of refusing to knowingly employ homosexuals as teachers was
violative of the fourteenth amendment's guaranties of due process and equal protection.
The court commented that the time had come for "private, consenting, adult
homosexuality to enter the sphere of constitutionally protectable interests." Id. at 851.
75. A. BEQuAI, supra note 2, at 92.
76. 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
77. Id. at 876.
78. Id. at 901.
79. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
80. Id. at 1187.
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ruled, however, that the program could be justified under the business
necessity exception.81 In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
Union v. American Cyanamid Co.,8" a company excluded women workers
from production jobs involving exposure to lead, unless they were surgically
sterilized.83 This policy was found permissible under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA).84 The court did not address the
issue of sexual discrimination in American Cyanamid.
Considering the holdings in these cases, it would appear that women may
be excluded from jobs where they are exposed to toxic chemicals that could
pose a substantial risk of harm to a fetus. The Supreme Court has not issued
an opinion on this topic and, furthermore, studies of male workers have shown
that lead, asbestos, beryllium, and organic solvents have effects on the
offspring of male workers similar to the effects of the agents on the fetuses
of female workers exposed in the workplace.85 Therefore, it may be
premature to conclude that women can be excluded from jobs based on fetal
harm.
Finally, employers are required to make reasonable accommodations for
the religious practices of their employees.86  An employer cannot be
compelled, however, to bear more than de minimis costs to accommodate the
religious practices of an employee. 7
G. Application Forms and Interviews
The inquiries discussed above may show up on an application form or in
the interview. The employment interview, given its convenience, is probably
the most often used selection device. 8  In spite of its frequent use, the
interview, in an uncontrolled setting, is plagued with problems. In light of the
81. Id. at 1189.
82. 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
83. Id. at 445.
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
85. See Note, Employment Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CALIF.
L. REV. 1113, 1117 n.17 (1977).
86. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-2(a)(l), (2) (1982).
87. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the Supreme
Court provided guidelines concerning the degree to which Title VII requires an
employer to accommodate the religious beliefs of its employees. See also Wren v.
T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979) (court held that T.I.M.E. should not
be required to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to accommodate Wren's
religious practices and thus were not required under Title VII to do so).
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recent Supreme Court decision in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,89
employers must now review their interview process for possible violations of
Title VII. In Watson, plaintiff Clara Watson was a black employee who had
applied for, and was denied, four supervisory positions at Fort Worth Bank &
Trust.' The bank's selection process for supervisory positions was based on
the subjective judgment of supervisors who had knowledge of the candidates
and the jobs to be filled.9 The Court held that impact analysis should
determine if the subjective selection procedure is proper.92 An interviewer
making a subjective decision will draw on her perspectives, beliefs, experi-
ence, and judgment. There are no identifiable external standards upon which
to measure the discretionary criteria, which results in a lack of uniformity. In
Watson, the Court noted that if the disparate impact analysis was not made
applicable to subjective criteria, employers could give subjective criteria
substantial but not absolute weight, and thereby avoid the strictures of
disparate impact.93 As a result, the employer could mask more easily an
intent to discriminate.94
Just how can employers conduct valid interviews? One commentator has
noted:
[Tihe use of employment interviews should be preceded by a thorough
analysis of the target job, the development of a structured set of questions
based on the job analysis, and the development of behaviorally specific
rating instruments by which to evaluate applicants .... Where non-test
predictors like interviewer judgments are used, the [employer] should
develop procedures that will minimize error resulting from differences
between judges.95
89. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). The Court in Watson held that discretionary decision-
making [subjective decision-making] by employers, which was challenged as violating
Title VII, may be scrutinized under the disparate impact rather than the disparate
treatment standard. Id. at 991. Thus, the question should be whether a facially neutral
employment practice has had a statistically significant adverse effect on members of
a minority group.
90. Id. at 982.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 989.
93. Id. at 989-90.
94. See Comment, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under
Title VII, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 970 (1987), which noted that employers intending
to discriminate could do so more easily if disparate impact was limited to objective
employment practices, and even those not intending to discriminate may move away
from objective criteria which may later be attacked.
95. Comment, Watson and Subjective Hiring Practices: The Continuing Saga of
Industrial Psychology, Title VII and Personnel Selection, 22 AKRON L. REV. 599, 619
1991]
15
et al.: Book Review
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Mr. Bequai had this simplistic, but excellent advice: "Confine the interview
to inquiries and questions that directly relate to the job," and "[a]pply your
standards equally to all applicants, regardless of race, sex, religion, or ethnic
background."' 9
IV. ADDITIONAL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
A. Age
Discrimination can occur in all the hiring procedures discussed above;
however, older workers may be subjected to discrimination solely because of
their age. Discrimination based on age is also a prohibited act. The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 196797 was enacted to protect older
workers from arbitrary employment practices and to protect those displaced
from jobs and unable to gain new employment.98 A request for age on an
application form or in an interview may violate the Act.99 Courts have found
that under certain circumstances the setting of a maximum hiring age may be
(1989) (quoting the APA amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court).
96. A. BEQUAI, supra note 2, at 110.
97. See supra note 10.
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988).
99. According to the Code of Federal Regulations:
A request on the part of an employer for information such as "Date of
Birth" or "State Age" on an employment application form is not, in itself,
a violation of the Act. However, because the request that an applicant state
his age may tend to deter older applicants or otherwise indicate discrimina-
tion based on age, employment application forms which request such
information will be closely scrutinized to assure that the request is for a
permissible purpose and not for a purpose proscribed by the Act.
29 C.F.R. § 1625.5 (1989).
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allowed.'0° In all cases, however, courts look at whether there is a bona fide
occupational qualification present when setting the maximum hiring age.
B. Reverse Discrimination
Mr. Bequai notes the recent tendency for reverse discrimination
cases.' These involve cases in which white male applicants sue because
an employer chose a woman or minority applicant over him. In United Steel
Workers v. Weber'°2 the Supreme Court approved race-conscious affirmative
action by employers where it is designed to remedy racial imbalance in
traditionally segregated job categories. The Eighth Circuit addressed this issue
in Setser v. Novack Investment Co.,'03 where it held that an employer is
entitled to summary judgment in a reverse discrimination case if the court
finds that the employer's affirmative action plan was bona fide.
The Eighth Circuit discussed what would constitute a bona fide plan
when it noted that
[p]rivate employers face loss of substantial federal contracts and liabilities
to minorities[] if they refuse to initiate affirmative action as a remedy for
past discrimination, and they face liability to whites for any voluntary
preferences accorded minorities .... [C]ourts are reluctant to discourage
100. In E.E.O.C. v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985), the court upheld the policy of a maximum hiring
age of thirty-two for state highway patrol troopers as based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification. In addition, the court upheld the mandatory retirement at
age sixty, because evidence did show that substantially all patrol members over the age
of sixty lacked sufficient aerobic capacity to safely and efficiently perform the duties
of a patrolman. Id. at 455. The court also upheld the maximum hiring age of thirty-
two for highway patrol radio operators because the patrol presented convincing
evidence that age for radio operator was a bona fide occupational qualification. See
also Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (maximum
hiring age of forty for bus drivers was a bona fide occupational qualification and
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business); Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 1122 (1975)
(maximum hiring age of thirty-five for bus drivers was upheld as a bona fide
occupational qualification); but see Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir.
1985) (maximum age of twenty-nine for hiring police officers was invalid where
evidence that individuals over forty could perform as well as those in their twenties);
E.E.O.C. v. City of Linton, 623 F. Supp. 724 (S.D. Ind. 1985) (statute setting
maximum hiring age at thirty-five for police officers was struck down where there was
no evidence to support claim of bona fide occupational qualification).
101. A. BEQUAI, supra note 2, at 141-42.
102. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
103. 657 F.2d 962 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1064 (1981).
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experimentation by employers in remedying past discrimination... [and
will find that a] plan is bonafide if it is reasonably related to its remedial
purposeY" 4
Considering this holding, it appears that Mr. Bequai's comment that one "will
have a better chance of coming out ahead if a prospective employee sues..
. for reverse discrimination than if the EEOC sues . . . for discriminating
against groups protected under Title VII'" 5 is probably accurate.
C. Handicapped
Handicapped individuals gained protected status from discrimination
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.16 The Rehabilitation Act applies only
to federal employers or those who receive federal assistance in the form of
grants, loans, contract or other federal funding.107 The Missouri statute,'O,
however, applies to all employers, and the Federal Americans With Disabili-
ties Act applies to all employers with fifteen or more employees. Congress
has broadly defined "handicapped individual" as "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more...
major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment. " "
Because of the broadness of this definition, it has been determined in
recent decisions that individuals afflicted with contagious diseases,"0 heart
disease,"' epilepsy,1 history of drug use,"3 and unusual sensitivity to
104. Id. at 970.
105. A. BEQUAI, supra note 2, at 140.
106. See supra note 11.
107. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.2, 84.3(f)-(h) (1989).
108. Mo. REV. STAT. § 213.055(1)(a) (1986).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1988). See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (1989)
(guidelines promulgated by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights which provide a
more comprehensive definition of handicapped).
110. School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (woman suffering from
tuberculosis can be considered handicapped since her condition is an impairment which
substantially limits major life activities); Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Center, 672 F.
Supp. 1221 (W.D. Mo. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 865 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1989)
(active carrier of hepatitis B is handicapped individual).
Since Arline Congress has amended the Rehabilitation Act definition of
"handicapped person" in order to make it specifically applicable to persons having
contagious diseases or infections. 134 CONG. REC. S1738-01 (1988).
111. Bey v. Bolger, 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (plaintiff was handicapped
individual where he had record of physical impairment, cardio-vascular disease,
uncontrolled blood pressure, cardia enlargement, and an abnormal electrocardiogram,
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tobacco smoke... are considered "handicapped," and thus protected under
the Rehabilitation Act. In all cases which have considered the rights of a
handicapped individual, however, it must be shown that he or she is
"otherwise qualified" to do the job. 5 In Laclede Cab Co. v. Missouri
Commission on Human Rights,1 1 6 for example, the court determined that a
taxicab company discriminated against an applicant whose left hand had been
amputated when evidence showed that he was capable of performing all the
duties of a taxicab driver.
Several court cases have dealt with the issue of whether individuals
infected with the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) virus are
"handicapped" and thus protected under the Rehabilitation Act.1 7 In light
of the decision in School Board v. Arline"8 and an amendment to the
which substantially limited major life activities).
112. Reynolds v. Brock, 815 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1987) (epilepsy is a handicap
under the Rehabilitation Act).
113. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that drug
addicts or persons with a history of drug use were to be considered handicapped). The
court felt that prior addiction and drug use fell clearly within the definition of
"handicapped individuals" as defined in the regulations. Id. at 796.
It should be noted that in Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 680 F. Supp.
590 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the court held that employees who tested positive for illegal drug
use were not handicapped individuals and thus were not protected under the
Rehabilitation Act. The court further found that state and federal statutes which
prohibit discrimination against handicapped individuals will not, and do not, protect
employees who have not previously been, or were not currently being, treated for
illegal drug use. Id. at 597-98.
114. Vickers v. Veterans Admin., 549 F. Supp. 85 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (individual
is handicapped where he has unusual sensitivity to tobacco smoke which limits his
capacity to work in environment which is not completely smoke-free).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988). See also 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1989), which
defines "qualified handicapped person" to mean: "With respect to employment, a
handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the job in question."
116. 748 S.W.2d 390 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
117. In Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 832 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1987), the
court concluded that the plaintiff was handicapped because of AIDS. Similarly, in
Local 1812 v. United States Dep't of State, 662 F. Supp. 50 (D. D.C. 1987), the court
concluded that those who carry the AIDS virus may be handicapped under the Act in
two ways: (1) a known carrier of the virus will be perceived to be handicapped; or
(2) carriers may be impaired physically because of some measurable deficiency in their
immune system. Id. at 54. See also Shuttleworth v. Broward County, 639 F. Supp
654 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (AIDS victim was found to have been discriminated against under
the Florida Commission on Human Relations Act).
118. See supra note 110.
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Rehabilitation Act which deals specifically with infections and contagious
diseases," 9 AIDS infected individuals should be able to invoke protection
from employment discrimination. This means that an employer may not
discriminate against an individual who tests positive for the AIDS virus if that
individual is otherwise qualified and capable of doing the job.
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Bequai's book was written for managers with little or no experience
in hiring law, and not as an in-depth review for attorneys. The anecdotal
cases that precede each chapter contain no citations and has used non-
technical language in his presentation. At the end of each chapter there are
one or more "rules to hire by" which should help managers avoid charges of
discrimination in their hiring decisions. The book is an extremely broad
overview of hiring regulations, but will at a minimum enable someone without
experience or knowledge in this area to realize that this is an area of law that
will affect each employer on a day-to-day basis.
Employment discrimination law is continually changing through
legislation and court decisions. Although this review tries to provide an
examination of current hiring law, it cannot be considered an analysis of the
law. Likewise, the book Every Manager's Legal Guide To Hiring should not
be viewed as a legal guide. It does, however, provide a feel for the status of
the law on hiring and some good general advice to managers. By using the
cases noted in this review, along with Every Manager's Legal Guide to
Hiring, the practitioner should have a broad overview of the current law as it
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